Realist Theory and the Moral Clarity Trap

Americans are big on “moral clarity” when it comes to justifying their own conduct or that of allies at war. Americans have little patience for international political theory. 

That is unfortunate, because one well-established theory in particular, structural realism, could help us better understand what is going on when nations and combatants come to blows.  Good theory can also forewarn us of brewing conflict before it explodes.

For instance, in the early 1990’s, Realists foresaw that the steady expansion of NATO eastward would encourage the resurgence of nationalist political forces in Russia. But since our intentions were presumably not to threaten Russia, American leaders pushed for expansion of the military alliance.

When the Biden administration, during Russia’s military build-up along the Ukrainian border, dismissed its security concerns as “non-starters”, Realists were undoubtedly alarmed. Such could not possibly deter an invasion by Putin, who had been warning against NATO expansion since 2007.

Similarly, some notable Realists opposed the Iraq War, warning of the sorts of blowback which indeed followed.

Conscious purposes and moral clarity do not explain behavior. What we might be “certain” of may be nothing more than a story we tell ourselves and which we want others to believe.

What is unfolding in Gaza, indeed what has unfolded in the last few decades between Israel and the Palestinians, cannot be explained by any presumed attributes of the actors. Notwithstanding that Hamas’s original charter sought the destruction of Israel, or the barbarity of its October 7 attack, and notwithstanding the extreme nature of the current Israeli leaders and their commitment to the settlement project, power dynamics may best explain events.

First, preponderant power does not restrain itself, and Israel has enjoyed a decisive power advantage for many years. Second, the less powerful actor often, if not usually, will resort to tactics the more powerful one will insist are out of bounds. In this case, Hamas and the more extreme Islamic Jihad commit full-blown terrorism. In turn, the more powerful actor in this case resorts to collective punishment of the population in which the perpetrators of terror embed themselves, which punishment is really no improvement over the atrocities it is responding to.

If circumstances and the distribution of power are strong determinants of behavior, it follows that were the situation reversed, with the Palestinians enjoying preponderant power, they might very well be oppressing the Israelis in a similar manner.

None of this is to excuse or gloss over the behavior of either side. But it can inform us about how best to help Israel and the Palestinians reverse this terrible dynamic.

Since power does not restrain itself, it is eventually checked by opposing power. This often happens at a colossal cost in lives. World War II is one example. 

If American policy toward Israel remains unchanged, the human toll will be tremendous. If we wish to avert that, we need to restrain our ally, Israel. We need to make it absolutely clear that our assistance is no longer unconditional. If Israel does not get the message, we should, for starters, cut that aid in half.

It should be no mystery to anyone what Israel needs to do in order to maintain its special relationship with its main backer: it needs to end its collective punishment of Palestinians and get deadly serious about a Palestinian state. It needs to reverse its settlement policy in the West Bank, beginning today.